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The Commodification of Body Parts of the Living – Looking eastward to go westward? 
 
 
Abstract: 
The philosophy on the procurement of body parts of the living for medical treatment purposes 
appears to be strengthened by altruism; or significantly rests on it. The other weak, and 
adjudged unethical, limb is pecuniary gains from their sales. These two - either profit making 
or altruism are apparently in sharp contrast. However opposed commercialisation may be to 
altruism, they are not entirely mutually exclusive. This paper explores the advancement in the 
thoughts to equate living human body parts with goods in commercial transactions. It seeks to 
suggest a framework for dealings in human body parts for return in cash and or other benevolent 
grounds, yet keeping altruism within reach. It points at the Iranian system to reinforce the way 
forward for the global community. 
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Living Human Body Parts in the Advancement of Medical Science 
Over the years medical science has developed and provided cures for diseases that were 
previously branded as incurable. Advanced therapeutic procedures, including the transplant of 
body parts from people who are either living or dead are some of the ways these cures have 
come about.1 From surface skin transplant of disfigured soldiers in the 1800’s, cornea 
transplant of blind patients in the 1900’s, through to internal kidney transplant that took off in 
                                                 
1 R Foran, Organ Transplants, (Essential Library, 2014), 8 – 13; J. Jeong, "Recent Advancements in Autologous 
Fat Grafting," Archives of Aesthetic Plastic Surgery (2014) 20.1, 3-7. 
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the 1950’s. These procedures cut across the whole structure of the human frame, from skin, 
through blood vessels,2 to extremely complex and internal human-to-human heart transplant.3 
 The demand for human body parts is usually met by supply from other humans – 
whether dead or living, though there are yet possibilities of manufactured parts being used to 
fit.4 And there is also the on-going attempts to harvest from animals organs that could be used 
to treat humans.5 Regenerative medicine, especially that involving the development of cell 
therapies whereby exogenous cells can be transplanted into tissues to help repair the damaged 
tissue or organs, has been promising a future of ready-made replacement organs - livers, 
kidneys, even hearts.6 But it has so far only delivered on bioartificial organs built in the 
laboratory using body’s cells, like a new windpipe for a cancerous one.7 Besides, many diseases 
result in chronic organ and tissue damage that is unlikely to be solved through conventional 
pharmaceutical approaches. The need for human to human transplant remains, and continues 
to grow in the face of the above alternatives. 
 As not all parts may be manufactured as yet, nor harvested from animals, body parts 
are still sourced from family members as primary sources. Analysis of donor data suggests that 
family and patient’s socio-demographics, particularly ethnicity, are significantly linked with 
                                                 
2 E. Eger II, L Saidman, and R Westhorpe, "1860–1910: The Specialty of Anesthesia Develops Slowly" The 
Wondrous Story of Anesthesia. (New York: Springer, 2014) 37-49; B François, E Sternberg and E Fee, "The 
Lourdes Medical Cures Revisited", Journal of the history of medicine and allied sciences 69.1 (2014): 135-162. 
3 Foran, Organ Transplants, 10 – 11; N. Sivkova, “Principles of plastic reconstruction for advanced carcinoma of 
eyelids discussed” Physician Law Weekly (Aug 24, 2005): 258. 
4 V. Marx, "Tissue engineering: Organs from the lab," (2015): 373. 
5 Sachs, David H. "The pig as a potential xenograft donor" Veterinary immunology and immunopathology 43, no. 
1-3 (1994): 185-191; Cooper, David KC, and Robert Paul Lanza. Xeno: the promise of transplanting animal 
organs into humans, Oxford University Press on Demand, 2000. 
6 “Printing body parts – making a bit of me” The Economist, February 18, 2010; A Selko, “The Next Wave of 
Manufacturing: Human Organs” Industryweek, June 6, 2013. 
7 H. Fountain, “A First: Organs Tailor-Made With Body’s Own Cells” The New York Times, September 15, 2012; 
S. Y. Rojahn, “Manufacturing Organs” MIT Technology Review, January 16, 2014. The problems and limitations 
of this other type of measure to treating patients could be gleaned from H. N. Chia and B. M. Wu, “Recent 
advances in 3D printing of biomaterials” Journal of biological engineering (2015) Dec;9(1):4. 
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the donation of body parts.8 This supports the normative transplant discourse in which gifting 
and altruism are assumed among kin.9  
 Members of the public may also donate to unknown donees. There may be calls for 
donation to which any persons could respond, particularly in cases where such donors suffer 
little or no remarkable consequences from the donation. A system whereby a bank of human 
body parts and reproductive materials are kept could also exist for those who might need them. 
It is in these and a variety of other ways that the altruistic donation of body parts of living 
persons operate. 
The word is altruism. It is the pride of the ideal. The ultimate aspiration of ethical 
medical science – but, sadly, not an easy to attain state. It is the willingness to do things that 
bring advantages to others, even if it results in disadvantage for oneself. It is self-sacrifice, 
public-spiritedness, humanitarianism, just to mention a few of its equivalents.10 Suffices to say 
that in this context altruism is the gifting of one’s body part to another without expecting 
something in return, especially money or its equivalent. This paper now turns to the possibility 
that any purpose other altruism informs the donation of body parts; and the ethical and or legal 
issues surrounding the alternative purposes. 
 
 
                                                 
8 L. Siminoff, et al, "Factors influencing families' consent for donation of solid organs for transplantation," Journal 
of America Medical Association 286.1 (2001): 71-77; S. H. Lee, et al. "Decision-related factors and attitudes 
toward donation in living related liver transplantation: ten-year experience," Transplantation Proceedings, Vol. 
37. No. 2. Elsevier, 2005. 
9 N. Scheper‐Hughes, "The tyranny of the gift: sacrificial violence in living donor transplants," American Journal 
of Transplantation 7.3 (2007): 507-511. See Also D. Biro, One hundred days: My unexpected journey from doctor 
to patient, (New York: Vintage, 2001). 
10 Its synonyms also include - unselfishness, selflessness, self-denial, consideration, compassion, kindness, 
goodwill, decency, nobility, generosity, magnanimity, liberality, open-handedness, free-handedness, big-
heartedness, lavishness, benevolence, beneficence, philanthropy, charity, charitableness. This paper shall however 
stick with the limited meaning of self-sacrifice, unless the context otherwise suggests. 
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Property Rights in Body Parts of Living Persons – Settled with much ado 
Most research works on the place of the person vis-a-vis his body parts or organs is founded 
on the proprietary rights of the person from whom the organs are obtained. This paper does not 
intend to argue otherwise, treating that as considerably settled and marginal to the discourse 
here.11 So organ donation, altruistic or otherwise, is proceeded on from the fact that the donor 
might do with his body parts whatsoever he wishes. It could be given to whomsoever he 
chooses.12 These general positions regarding whatsoever and to whomsoever body parts may 
be given however have their practical and or medical, as well as legal limits - the potential 
donor might be constrained by both legal and real intricacies involved with donating human 
body parts. Hence his wish to do good might be controlled. Compatibility of body parts is a 
major consideration in matching donors and donees. The more closely related the donor is to 
the patient, the more chances of a smooth transplant. Consequently, skin grafts from family 
members seemed to survive longer than those from unrelated donors.13 
 Nonetheless, the preference for relatives in organ donation does not solve the legal 
problems, assuming there are no issues with medical compatibility between the donors and the 
                                                 
11 On the proprietary rights of donors, the long held view of the common law is the old rule that “no one is to be 
regarded as the owner of his own limbs” - Ulpian, Edict D 9 2 13 pr. Or “a living human body is incapable of 
being owned”. This principle has its background in Roman law. According to a famous text of Ulpian, the body 
of a free man or woman was not susceptible to ownership - E Levy, “Natural law in the Roman period” (1949) 
Nat. L. Inst. Proc.; 2:43 at 53. But this settled common law rule has been qualified over time. Quite recently, in 
Yearworth and others v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37 the court extensively reviewed the basis 
of that position and agreed that common law can respond to the ever-expanding frontiers of medical science. It 
thus held that there is property right in body samples like ejaculated sperm stored for the future benefit of the 
person who ejaculated it because by their bodies, they generated and ejaculated the sperm. Scholars have lashed 
on to this and taken the discourse further such that the Yearworth case seems to strengthen what had been the 
favoured position. Magnusson argued that human tissue may usefully be regarded as personal property to enforce 
possession, to prevent damage and destruction, for the purposes of criminal offences such as theft, and for the 
purposes of bailment. According to him, the view that human tissue has no status in law reflects a bygone era in 
which the uses to which human tissue could be put were not recognized. He calls for a fresh consideration of the 
common law authorities supporting the “no property” rule - R S Magnusson, "Recognition of Proprietary Rights 
in Human Tissue in Common Law Jurisdictions, The Melb. UL Rev. 18 (1991): 601. 
12 J. Harris, "Who owns my body" Oxford J. Legal Stud.16 (1996): 55; R. Hardcastle, Law and the human body: 
property rights, ownership and control, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007; A. Grubb, "‘I, me, mine’: bodies, parts 
and property" Medical Law International 3, no. 4 (1998): 299-317; L. Skene, "Proprietary rights in human bodies, 
body parts and tissue: regulatory contexts and proposals for new laws" Legal studies 22, no. 1 (2002): 102-128. 
13 J. E. Murray, "Human organ transplantation: background and consequences" Science 256.5062 (1992): 1411-
1416. 
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receivers. There are often questions about the process of donation, obtaining informed consent 
– like the exercise of the right to donate in the event of an underage or one who is incapable of 
consenting to his organ being donated as a result of the state of the mind or body. Should the 
organ of such a person be used to facilitate the treatment of another family member? This raises 
another set of serious ethical concerns. What if the donor is motivated by anything but pure 
altruism? Where is the line drawn in the spectrum of altruism, what point on the continuum 
from the high end of pure to impure is acceptable, legal and ethical? When does altruism cease 
to be pure altruism and how does the law respond? For the benefit of undertaking a focused 
discussion of these points this paper shall consider the exact scope of the donation of body 
parts by living persons during their lives, with the ability to give informed consent. The only 
question sought to be resolved therefore is whether or not altruism could be placed side by side 
the seeking of pecuniary gain for the donation of body parts by a living person capable of giving 
the requisite consent. 
 Whether the body part was that of the living or dead made a difference because the 
proposition had always been that a body part, for so long as it is joined to a living body, is not 
susceptible of ownership; then when excised from the body it would be an ownerless thing.14 
Thus the use of skills translates a body part to an item that is capable of being owned. Intuitively 
however it appears unfair to the source of that body part. A more realistic and just approach, 
which is supported by authorities in both the Common Law and modern Civil Law15 is that a 
part removed from a person's body, say in the course of an operation, is automatically owned 
by that person by operation of law. Since the dead donor is incapable of, at the very least, 
                                                 
14 See N. R. Whitty, “Rights of personality, property rights and the human body in Scots law”, Edin. L.R. 2005, 
9(2), 194-237; L.D. Rostill, “The ownership that wasn't meant to be: Yearworth and property rights in human 
tissue” Journal of medical ethics, 2014 Jan 1;40(1):14-8; G. Calabresi, "An introduction to legal thought: four 
approaches to law and to the allocation of body parts" Stanford law review (2003): 2113-2151. 
15 J. V. M. Welie, and A. M. J. ten Have, "Ownership of the human body: the Dutch context" In Ownership of the 
Human Body, (Springer, Dordrecht), 1998, pp. 99-114. 
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feeling the pain or considering after-donation care, the scope here as to the role of altruism on 
the decision of the living is apt. While next of kin or other relatives may suffer emotionally and 
otherwise, they are unable to share in the physical circumstances of the donor for whom 
altruistic considerations are relevant. 
 
The Different Shades of Altruism 
Sometimes, the pervasiveness of a term gives the impression that its meaning is unequivocal, 
particularly when the term is one that fits into a variety of multi-disciplinary contexts. It might 
lack the precision, uniformity, and neutrality that academic terms are supposed to have.16 The 
term “altruism” seems to belong in this category as it broadly has both economic and 
psychological imports, in addition to a range of others. It is here intended to examine how the 
term may apply to organ donation, from the angle of what informs the decision to act 
altruistically. 
 When people make donations towards privately provided public goods, such as charity, 
there may be many factors influencing their decisions other than altruism. As Olson noted, 
people are sometimes motivated by a desire to win prestige, respect, friendship, or even to 
avoid scorn.17 Social pressure, guilt, sympathy, or simply a desire for a “warm glow” may also 
play important roles in the decisions to act charitably or altruistically. The question then is if 
the donor is motivated by any of these impulses that seem to likewise give the donor some 
benefit, however intangible that benefit may be, is it still purely altruistic? If the altruist is ex 
                                                 
16 D. S. Wilson and L. A. Dugatkin, “Altruism: contemporary debates” In E. R. Keller and E. A. Lloyd, (eds) 
Keywords in Evolutionary Biology, 1992, pg 29 – 33. See also B. Kerr, P. Godfrey-Smith and M. W. Feldman, 
“What is altruism?” in Trends in ecology & evolution, 19(3), 135-140. 
17 M. Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Second printing 
with new preface and appendix. Vol. 124. Harvard University Press, 2009. This is also consistent with the 
“socialization/culturalization account” of G. H. Mead in C. W. Morris (Ed.), Mind, self and society, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
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ante aware of the possibility that the recipient’s need for clothes has been caused by the 
recipient’s distaste for work, the act of altruism might be laced with condescending pity. Or 
might one then slide down the scale to another kind of altruism described as impure altruism? 
Andreoni who coined the term ‘‘warm glow’’, defines ‘‘impure’’ altruistic action as the act 
that is partially motivated by the ‘‘warm glow’’, and not purely motivated by the concern over 
the beneficiary’s welfare. This is quite comparable to altruism for egoistic reasons.18 Andreoni 
introduced a generalisation of the standard public goods model that includes 'impurely 
altruistic' motives. In contrast to the impure altruism model, an important alternative approach 
was to consider moral or group-interested behaviour.19 Sugden, for instance, showed that public 
goods approach to philanthropy may flow from people who may adhere to “moral constraints” 
or a “principle of reciprocity”.20 It is also clear, needs to be said, from a review of these 
academic literatures that there must be a purpose for altruistic actions, whether positive or 
otherwise. 
 While altruism has been generally accepted as the ethical reason for organ donation, it 
has been defined in ways that allow various shades of the word to purport the ethical ground 
for donation of organs and body parts. In the UK for example, altruism has long been taken to 
be the guiding principle of ethical organ donation, and has been used as justification for 
rejecting or allowing certain types of donation. But despite this central role, altruism has been 
poorly defined in policy and position documents, and increasingly used confusingly and 
                                                 
18  J. Andreoni, "Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-glow giving" The economic 
journal 100, no. 401 (1990): 464-477 
19 This has been done by A. K. Sen, 'Rational fools: a critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory' 
 Journal of Philosophy and Public Affairs, (1977) vol. 6, pp. 317-4; D. A. Collard, Altruism and Economy, a Study 
in Nonselfish Economics, Martin Robertson and Company, Ltd.; J. J. Laffont, 'Macroeconomic constraints, 
economic efficiency and ethics: an introduction to Kantian economics' Economica, (1975) vol. 42, pp. 430-7; H. 
Margolis, Selfishness, Altruism and Rationality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1982); and R. Sugden, 'On 
the economics of philanthropy' Economic Journal, 1982 vol. 92, pp. 341-50; and R. Sugden, 'Reciprocity: the 
supply of public goods through voluntary contributions' Economic Journal, (1984) vol. 94, pp. 772-87. 
20  R. Sugden, 'Reciprocity: the supply of public goods through voluntary contributions' Economic Journal, (1984) 
vol. 94, pp. 772-87 
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inconsistently.21 The recent report from the Nuffield Council on Bioethics offered a clearer 
definition. This definition that altruism “entailing a selfless gift to others without expectation 
of remuneration”22 is however, more permissive than that of altruism previously seen in UK 
policy, and as a result allows some donations that previously have been considered 
unacceptable. These include conditional and directed donations by organ donors where a 
condition could serve to exclude certain recipients, or others are excluded because the organ is 
directed at a certain group, especially relatives – living-related donation.23 Such limited 
delineation of altruism means that the Greg and others strongly argued for ethical purpose to 
go beyond altruism as narrowly defined. They suggest that it should not be insisted upon that 
altruism is a necessary as opposed to desirable component of ethical donation. 
 
Self-determination at end of life – A Comparative Paradigm 
The concept of the person is heavily bound up in the values of the culture in which one lives. 
This is also the case for the management of the affairs of the person. For example, the person 
may just be the body of the person in one society; and that person is solely responsible for his 
being, actions and decisions. But the person may yet be much more in other societies, like 
where necessarily the next of kin or significant others may have a say in how matters regarding 
the person are managed. The involvement of others may be on matters bothering on the day to 
day being of this person, to other occasions where the person is incapable of making certain 
types of decisions himself. This is apparent in contrasting the “independent self” common to 
Western cultures which is based on individual autonomy, with the “interdependent self” of 
                                                 
21 G. Moorlock, J. Ives, and H. Draper, “Altruism in organ donation: an unnecessary requirement?” 2014 Journal 
of Medical Ethics, 40(2), pp.134-138. 
22 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Human bodies: donation for medicine and research. (London: Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics, 2011). 
23 Department of Health, An investigation into conditional organ donation [report of the panel]. London: 
Department of Health, 2000. 
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Eastern cultures which includes significant others within the concept. The independent self is 
likely to activate motivation to be independent and to withstand social pressure, while the 
interdependent self may activate motivation to maintain harmony and conform to others’ 
opinions.24 The independent self will focus on internal attributes - ability, intelligence, 
personality, goals, preferences, rights. The interdependent self is characterised by the tendency 
to fit in and be part of a relevant ongoing relationship, will strive to meet and or create duties, 
obligations, and social responsibilities. 
 This construction of the self feeds into the legal framework for determining the rights 
of the person over his body parts. The concept of the self could be more properly seen in the 
view of William James who said that a man's self is the sum total of all that he could call his, 
not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, 
his ancestors and friends his reputation and works, his lands, and yacht and bank-account.25 
This is whether one looks at it as the Western independent self, or the interdependent self of 
the Eastern culture. But beyond the broad connotation, cross-cultural study revealed that, 
relative to Western cultures, East and Southeast Asian cultures are generally more 
collectivistic. 26 Collectivism provides social support and feelings of belonging, but also brings 
anxiety about not meeting social obligations. While individualists, on the other hand, see 
themselves as more differentiated and separate from other people, including family and 
friends.27  
                                                 
24 Torelli, C. J., "Individuality or conformity? The effect of independent and interdependent self-concepts on 
public judgments." Journal of Consumer Psychology 16.3 (2006): 240-248. 
25 W. James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1, (New York: Henry Holt, 1890), pp. 291-292. 
26 D. L. Alden, & A. H. Cheung, “Organ donation and culture: A comparison of Asian American and European 
American beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors” Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 2000, 30(2), 293-314. 
27 C, L. Caldwell-Harris & A. Aycicegi, “When personality and culture clash: The psychological distress of 
allocentrics in an individualist culture and idiocentrics in a collectivist culture” Transcultural psychiatry, (2006) 
43(3), 331-361. 
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An expression of self also is the exercise of the autonomy of choice which is an element 
in the dignity of the human person. This implies that one is entitled to make choices about how 
one is treated or how one’s body is managed, to put it in the most general terms. It is generally 
understood as self-governance, self-regulation or self-direction and as the paramount principle 
that underlies refusal of medical treatment.28 In most present-day societies a competent 
patient's refusal of life-prolonging medical treatment must be respected, and the right to self-
determination thus challenges the arguments based on the sanctity of life.29 The right of 
autonomy is protected under the European Convention on Human Rights. In Pretty v United 
Kingdom30 the European Court of Human Rights affirmed that the right of autonomy came 
within the protection of Article 8 of the ECHR even to the extent of assisted suicide in certain 
circumstances.31 
 Autonomy is not without its limits. The sanctity of human life gives weight to the 
argument that “because all lives are intrinsically valuable, it is always wrong intentionally to 
kill an innocent human being”32 including the life of the killer, in some situations. Human 
dignity, it is further argued, does not reside in the freedom to choose to live or to die but is a 
condition of the freedom itself; individuals cannot give up their human dignity.33 A more 
restricted conception of autonomy is that it is an exclusively negative freedom, no more than a 
right to a “natural” death. Thus, any rights amounting to “right to die”, as broadly conceived, 
                                                 
28 McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 A.C. 59 (HL), per Lord Millett at para 123 - the freedom to limit 
the size of one’s family as an important aspect of personal autonomy. See also Chester v. Afshar [2005] 1 A.C. 
134 (HL) for consideration of autonomy as involving making an adequately informed choice. 
29 D. Price, “What shape to euthanasia after Bland? Historical, contemporary and futuristic paradigms” Law 
Quarterly Review 2009, 125(Jan), 142-174. See Lord Donaldson M.R. in Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical 
Treatment) [1993] Fam. 95 CA (Civ Div) at 112E; Secretary of State for the Home Department v Robb [1995] 
Fam. 127 Fam Div and Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] A.C. 789 HL. 
30 [2002] ECHR 2346/02. 
31 This contrasts with the narrow view of Article 8 taken by Lord Bingham and Lord Steyn in R (Pretty) v DPP 
[2002] 1 AC 800. Both Lords regarded Article 8 as protecting autonomy in life but not in relation to the ending 
of life. 
32 J. Keown, “Courting Euthanasia? Tony Bland and the Law Lords”, Ethics and Medicine, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1993. 
33 CE, 27 Octobre 1995, Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge, Rec. Lebon, p. 372. See “France: debate over right to 
end life” Public Law, 2009, Apr, 401-402. 
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has been rejected by the tribunals in England,34 America,35 Canada,36 France, Australia, 
Germany, and the list goes on.37 It could be inferred that even in the liberal states, there is still 
some restriction on any exercise of the expression of the right to die. Thus, in the most unlikely 
of cases where death is debatably a valid option like in euthanasia, the person is still entitled to 
the control of his body and the parts thereof. More so when he is alive. 
 It is because of the moral import of body autonomy that informed consent must be 
obtained from a person before any organs are harvested from him. This practice is essential 
because a person cannot engage in autonomous decision-making if he cannot control what 
happens to his body. Now it is common in medical ethics to give the principle of respect for 
autonomy the highest priority. And this is why medical ethics generally takes informed consent 
to be a sacrosanct requirement: it is the guardian of patients’ control over what happens to their 
own bodies.38 By extension, it appears that body autonomy will also include the choice as to 
the destination of one’s organs; a bit further than the consent to be a donor after death.39 
  
The Helplessness of the Criminal Law 
The ability to conduct one's life in a manner of one's own choosing may also include the 
opportunity to pursue activities perceived to be of a physically or morally harmful or dangerous 
                                                 
34 R. (on the application of Pretty) v DPP [2001] UKHL 61; [2002] 1 A.C. 800. 
35 Washington v Glucksberg 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Vacco v Quill 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997). 
36 Rodriguez v British Columbia (Att Gen) [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 Sup Ct (Can). 
37 J. Cohen, et al, "Trends in acceptance of euthanasia among the general public in 12 European countries (1981–
1999)" The European Journal of Public Health 16.6 (2006): 663-669; O. Dyer, C. White, and A. G. Rada, 
"Assisted dying: law and practice around the world" Bmj 351 (2015): h4481. 
38 M. B. Gill, "Presumed consent, autonomy, and organ donation." The Journal of medicine and philosophy 29, 
no. 1 (2004): 37-59. 
39 V. English and A. Sommerville, “Presumed consent for transplantation: a dead issue after Alder Hey?” 
2003 Journal of Medical Ethics, 29(3), pp.147-152; M. T. Hilhorst, “Directed altruistic living organ donation: 
partial but not unfair” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2005 8(1-2), pp.197-215; M. Epstein and G. Danovitch, 
“Is altruistic-directed living unrelated organ donation a legal fiction?” Nephrology Dialysis Transplantation, 2009 
24(2), p.357. 
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nature for the individual concerned. These are also an expression of the individual’s right to 
private life. Thus the right to have one’s body parts donated to another is squarely within one’s 
right to private life, and regardless of cultural affiliations it ought to be within the individual’s 
right to decide one way or the other. Yet the way and manner of conducting this expression of 
one’s fundamental right might trigger the application of the criminal law. 
 In deed both human rights and penal law feature significantly in regulating this aspect 
of law. The extent to which a State can use compulsory powers or the criminal law to protect 
people from the consequences of their chosen lifestyle has long been a topic of moral and 
jurisprudential discussion.40 The interference of state law is often viewed as trespassing on the 
private and personal sphere adding to the vigour of the debate. Even where a given practice 
poses a danger to health or, arguably, where it is of a life-threatening nature, the case-law of 
the United Nations institutions regards the State's imposition of compulsory or criminal 
measures as impinging on the private life of the applicant within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 
and requiring justification.41  
 Furthermore, if self-ownership of parts of one’s body is a settled norm of law, to what 
extent does the criminal law interfere in the exercise of proprietary rights by such owners over 
these properties? Various legal systems will have their divers approach to the ownership and 
consequent dealings in human body parts. Thus the use of property rhetoric in the context of 
human body parts may be wholly proper, or at least explainable. But such analysis of property 
rights in human body parts could not be similarly applied when reproductive parts are in issue. 
On sperm or eggs as property, few judicial decisions that have arisen have largely been 
                                                 
40 D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, (Oxford: OUP, 1984); H. L. A. Hart & H. L. A. Hart, Law, liberty, and morality. 
(Stanford University Press. 1963); R Johns and A. Sedgwick “Protecting People from Themselves” in Law for 
Social Work Practice (London: Palgrave, 1999). 
41 A. Mowbray, “The European Convention on Human Rights: The Abolution of Capital Punishment and Recent 
Cases” (2002) Hum. Rts. L. Rev., 2, 311; G. Arruego, “End of life decisions in the case of incompetent and 
terminally ill children under Spanish Law” Biolaw Journal-Rivista Di Biodiritto, (2016) (3), 167-183. 
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confined to requests for posthumous conception in circumstances where the widow of a 
deceased man has claimed that her husband had a right of property in respect of his sperm, and 
was thus entitled to dispose of it to his wife in order that she may become pregnant after his 
death.42 In the U.S., it has been held that the rights of the donors of genetic material is akin to 
ownership, in that the donors should have decision-making authority in respect of the use to 
which the material is to be put. In Davis v. Davis,43 the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the 
embryos, which were the subject of a custody dispute between a divorced couple, occupied an 
interim category between persons and property, which entitled them to special respect due to 
their potential for human life. 
 In the broader scope of human body parts generally, the common law has been shaped 
by the decision in Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust44  which held that the sperm that had 
been banked at a fertility unit amounted to property that was owned by the producer of it.45 The 
Australian case of Doodeward v Spence46 in 1908 had ruled that there was property in a human 
body, or part of a human body, with the property right being that of one who had done work or 
exercised skill that conferred on it a different attribute. This position was not accepted in 
Yearworth in its holding that the sperm was owned by the producer of it, rather than the 
establishment that had preserved it. Yearworth was in itself not conclusive on the bundle of 
rights owned in body parts, and being on reproductive parts, but by its explicit recognition that 
parts and products of the human body may be the subject of property without the acquisition 
                                                 
42 Paraplaix v. CECOS Trib.Gr.Inst. Creteil, 16-17 September, 1984, Gazette du Palais (2e sem.); Hecht v. 
Superior Court 20 Cal Reptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993), 16 Cal App, 4th 836 (1993). See Madden, D., “Recent 
developments in assisted human reproduction: legal and ethical issues” Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 2001, 
7(2), 53-62. 
43 842 S. W. 2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
44 [2010] Q.B. 1 
45 See also R. v Kelly (Anthony Noel) [1999] Q.B. 621; [1999] 2 W.L.R. 384. 
46 6 C.L.R. 406. 
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of different attributes by the application of skill, “it has potentially cleared away a piece of 
legal artifice that has bemused commentators for some time.”47 
 The property dimension to body parts thus means that the control of property might be 
imported into the dynamics in dealings in body parts. The next question is how valid then is 
the state control of how one deals in one’s property? Clearly, a statutory enactment on dealings 
in private property will be what it is – the law. But how valid is this law, and how consistent is 
it with the expectations of the society it governs? A survey of such laws coupled with ethical 
and moral values will give a cursory view. 
 In the science of Law and rationality, it has often been propounded that “a human being 
is not entitled to sell his limbs for money, even if he were offered ten thousand thalers for a 
single finger”.48 But this belongs to the discourse when there was no property right in body 
parts. Although the debate has moved beyond property rights, the bases for no right to deal in 
one’s body parts remain just as valid – the self-respect, humanity and dignity reasons.49 These 
have been backed up by a number of national laws outlawing trading in body parts. 
The Human Tissue Act 200450, which applies in England, Wales, Northern Ireland, 
Section 33 provides for the offence and consequent penalties related to the removal and 
transplantation of organs and other material from living donors in circumstances other than 
those provided for in regulations made under this section. These include circumstances where 
the Act is satisfied that no reward has been given in relation to the transplant. The National 
Organ Transplant Act of the United States imposes imprisonment and criminal fines for the 
                                                 
47 H. E. H. Shawn and T. L. Graeme, “Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust: property, principles, precedents and 
paradigms” C.L.J. 2010, 69(3), 476, 484. 
48 I. Kant, "The metaphysical principles of virtue" (1964). 
49 S. R. Munzer, "Kant and property rights in body parts" Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 6, no. 2 
(1993): 319-341. 
50 c. 30. 
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knowing purchase or sale of human organs, including kidneys, livers, hearts, and bone marrow, 
for use in human transplantation.51 
The criminal law in Israel prohibits doing grievous harm to another or wounding him, 
even if such harm was done with his consent, unless it has been for his own treatment.52 Thus 
an operation for the removal of an organ from a healthy person for transplantation, which is 
not for the person’s treatment, is illegal. Israel’s system for organ donation has been based, 
since its inception in 1968, on a model in which organs for transplantation are retrieved from 
brain-dead donors only after consent has been obtained from the appropriate first-degree 
relatives. This consent is needed even if the potential donor has expressed a wish for 
posthumous organ donation by signing a donor card, a government form that allows people to 
voluntarily indicate their wish to donate specified organs after their death.53 It was rather 
significant that in a case the Supreme Court refused an application to remove a kidney from a 
retarded person in order to transplant it into his father's body, even without touching on the 
question of whether it would have been permitted if the son had been an intellectually able 
adult.54 It can be argued that this decision was founded on the fact that the son could not give 
the required consent, as against what his father might have wished for. As regards incapable 
persons, minors, and anyone under guardianship, the Legal Capability and Guardianship Law 
196255 of Israel states that a court is not allowed to order any surgery or any other medical 
measures unless the court has been convinced by medical opinion that these measures are 
needed to maintain the physical or mental well-being of the minor, incapable person, or person 
under guardianship. Removal of organs from such a person for transplant is, therefore, illegal. 
                                                 
51 42 U.S.C.A. S 274 (W). 
52 D. A. Frenkel, "The Israeli law on transplantation, autopsy, dissection, and inquest of death" Medico-Legal 
Journal of Ireland, 1998, 4(2), 67-68. 
53 J. Lavee, T. Ashkenazi, G. Gurman, & D. Steinberg, “A new law for allocation of donor organs in Israel” The 
Lancet, (2010) 375(9720), 1131-1133. 
54 L. to App. 698/86, 184/87 X. v. A.G. [1988] 42(2) P.D. 661 at 701 (per Elon, Dep. C-J.) (in Hebrew). 
55 D. A. Frenkel, "The Israeli law on transplantation, autopsy, dissection, and inquest of death" at 67. 
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In China, in 1995 the Human Organ Transplant Ordinance was first enacted by the 
Ministry of Health together with other related ministries in the People’s Republic of China to 
prohibit commercial dealings in human organs intended for transplant, as well as to regulate 
the transplantation of human organs between living persons.56 Further, Human Transplantation 
Act that bans commercialism was adopted in May 2007.  
By the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,57 
notably the principle set out in Article 3(2)(c) thereof – “In the fields of medicine and biology, 
the following must be respected in particular: the prohibition on making the human body and 
its parts as such a source of financial gain.” That principle is also enshrined in Article 21 of the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine of the Council of Europe,58 which many 
Member States have ratified – “The human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to 
financial gain.” 
No less important is the World Health Organization Guiding Principles on Human Cell, 
Tissue and Organ Transplantation. 59 It provides that cells, tissues and organs should only be 
donated freely, without any monetary payment or other reward of monetary value.60 According 
to the commentary to the Guiding Principles - The basis for this strict non commercialisation 
position is that payment for cells, tissues and organs is likely to take unfair advantage of the 
poorest and most vulnerable groups, undermining altruistic donation, and leading to 
profiteering and human trafficking. Such payment, it reasons, conveys the idea that some 
                                                 
56 J. Huang, “Ethical and legislative perspectives on liver transplantation in the People's Republic of China” Liver 
transplantation, 13(2), 193-196. 
57 2000/C 364/01. 
58 Oviedo, 4.IV.1997. 
59 Sixty-Third World Health Assembly, "WHO guiding principles on human cell, tissue and organ transplantation" 
Guiding Principle 5. 
60 Sixty-Third World Health Assembly, "WHO guiding principles on human cell, tissue and organ transplantation" 
(2010): 413-419. 
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persons lack dignity, that they are mere objects to be used by others. This ensures there can be 
no trafficking in human materials. 
 Even from religious and cultural shared values, the marketization of human body parts 
poses a problem. For example, in the Islamic faith and practices, as organ transplantation has 
not been explicitly dealt with in the Koran, there is a mix of opinions among Muslim jurists. 
While those from the Arab countries appear to consider it allowable, scholars from the Indian 
subcontinent believe that organ transplantation is not permissible because human life is sacred; 
the human body is entrusted to an individual and thus does not belong to him or her; and 
transplantation can lead to illegal trade in organs and the poor would suffer.61 Addressing the 
participants at the Third International Congress of the Middle East Society for Organ 
Transplantation in 1992, Sheick M.M. Sellami, Grand Mufti of the Republic of Tunisia said 
“… according to Islam a human being is not the owner of a part or the whole of his body. In 
any case, organs should not be traded, but donated.” But to the contrary, much earlier in 1952, 
the supreme head of the Islamic School of Jurisprudence in Egypt stated that if anything was 
of good for mankind then “necessity allows what is prohibited.” Such rulings allow transplants 
of organs as long as certain conditions are satisfied: a transplant is the only form of treatment 
available; the likelihood of success of the transplant is high; the consent of the donor or next 
of kin is obtained; death of the donor has been fully established by a Muslim doctor of repute, 
or there is no imminent danger to the life of a living donor; and the recipient has been informed 
of the operation and its implications.62 The conditions do not go as far as considering any form 
of compensation or remuneration to the donor. In similar vein, while speaking at the XVIII 
                                                 
61 A. R. Gatrad, “Muslim customs surrounding death, bereavement, postmortem examinations, and organ 
transplants” (1994) BMJ: British Medical Journal, 309(6953), 521. 
62 A. F. M. Ebrahim and A. A. Haffejee. The Shari'ah and organ transplant, (Johannesburg: Islamic Medical 
Association of South Africa, 1989). 
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International Congress of the Transplantation Society in 2000, Pope John Paul II63 said “… any 
procedure which tends to commercialize human organs or to consider them as items of 
exchange or trade must be considered morally unacceptable, because to use the body as an 
‘object’ is to violate the dignity of the human person.”64 So the popular and main stream view 
is really – no commercial gains from organ donation. Any money involved should be such as 
to facilitate the process, making up for pains on either side, especially the donor. Cash for 
organs, in the core commercial sense, is prohibited because, as has been shown already, a line 
of laws criminalise it in most parts of the world. 
 Clearly, outright commercial dealings in human body parts is illegal and usually treated 
as repugnant from a wide range of sources. But is there a chance that the option of 
compensating donors for the act of donating is taken a bit too far? Is there the likelihood of 
some being in it for the reward, even if not in monetary value? And what would the ethical and 
legal consequences of that be? 
  
A Market for Human Body Parts? 
The possibility for commercialisation of human body parts gains strength from the subtle 
language with which the non-commercialisation nevertheless allows some form of reward for 
organ donation. For example, the World Health Organization Guiding Principles on Human 
Cell, Tissue and Organ Transplantation  provides that the prohibition on sale or purchase of 
cells, tissues and organs does not preclude reimbursing reasonable and verifiable expenses 
                                                 
63 The Pope represents the custodian of the values, ethics and teaching of the Catholic Church, one of the largest 
sectors of the Christian faith. See J. Mahoney, "The making of moral theology: A study of the Roman Catholic 
tradition" (Oxford University Press, 1987); R. F. Costigan, The Consensus of the Church and Papal Infallibility: 
a study in the background of Vatican I. (CUA Press, 2005). 
64 P. Bruzzone, “Religious aspects of organ transplantation” In Transplantation proceedings, 2008 (Vol. 40, No. 
4, pp. 1064-1067). Elsevier. 
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incurred by the donor, including loss of income, or paying the costs of recovering, processing, 
preserving and supplying human cells, tissues or organs for transplantation. It allows for 
circumstances where it is customary to provide donors with tokens of gratitude that cannot be 
assigned a value in monetary terms. The principle nevertheless loses sight of the fact that 
incentives in the form of “rewards” with monetary value that can be transferred to third parties 
are not different from monetary payments. Such incentives can be monetised and indeed could 
form the basis of a trade. 
 In the same vein Section 32 of the United Kingdom Human Tissue Act 2004 allows for 
the possibility of commercial tissue banks by allowing licence-holders to receive more than 
just expenses in relation to these activities. This section also allows for costs incurred by others 
to be passed along a chain of suppliers; including allowing for the reimbursement for expenses 
or loss of earning connected with transporting, removing, preparing, preserving or storing the 
body of a deceased person or relevant human material. Even a California statute which 
prohibits a person from knowingly acquiring, receiving, selling, or promoting the transfer or 
otherwise transferring any organ for transplantation for valuable consideration, is directed 
against brokering organs rather than the direct selling from a donor to a recipient. This is 
because there is an exception to the ban on selling and buying for "the person from whom the 
organ is removed, [or] ... the person who receives the transplant, or those persons' next-of-kin 
who assisted in obtaining the organ for purposes of transplantation.65 
 The argument for altruism, regardless of what type of altruism, as the only decent 
motivation for donation is flawed on many fronts. The considerations for being a willing donor 
vary from person to person. Besides there may be medical implications for a donor even if the 
donee’s need is greater than the donor’s.66 Commercial transactions are not always lacking in 
                                                 
65 Cal. Penal Code S. 367f (e) 
66 McFall v Schimp, 10 Pa. D. & C. 3d 90 (1978); Curran v. Bosze, 566 NE 2d 1319 – 1990. 
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ethics. This is as correct as suggesting that all practices in the medical profession are strictly 
and solely underscored by ethical considerations. They are not mutually exclusive for the 
practising medical practitioner has as much interest in affording a decent life as he has in giving 
his patient the services that give them the best chance for a decent life. The altruistic position 
glosses over the inherent nature of man as one interested in cost-benefit analysis.67 But 
Bentham thinks that nature has placed mankind under the governance of two separate concepts, 
pain and pleasure; and these two govern humans in all they do.68 Indeed, even the most basic 
human action could be justified on economic grounds of opportunity cost. Although individuals 
may be mistaken in this calculation process, the human nature automatically uses opportunity 
cost as the criterion in making choices and preferences because generally individuals aim to 
maximise their self-interest.69 The role of regulation then should be in helping with the 
evaluation of the risk and benefit balance with consideration for the same calculation for others 
who might be affected by the actions. Getting this balance right, again will steer most actions 
to donate in the direction of being ethical, but not necessarily altruistic.  
 Where a system allows for reasonable compensation, it permits reimbursement for the 
costs of making donations, including medical expenses and lost earnings for live donors. This 
is because such costs could act as disincentive even to donors with no interests in the 
compensation other than to donate to save lives. Payments to cover legitimate costs of 
procurement and of ensuring the safety, quality and efficacy of human cell and tissue products 
and organs for transplantation are also accepted as long as the human body and its parts are not 
a source of financial gain. Incentives may also be by way of money to purchase essential items 
                                                 
67 R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 8th ed. (2010), at 3; P. J. Held, and others, “A cost‐benefit analysis 
of government compensation of kidney donors” American Journal of Transplantation, 16(3), 877-885. 
68 Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. 1. 
69 A. Moazed, “Posner in pursuit of wealth: taking rights seriously”, UCL Juris. Rev. 1997, 4, 1-24, 5. 
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which donors would otherwise be unable to afford, such as medical care or health insurance 
cover. 
The argument that is made for payments made for human cells used for research are 
also valid here. Freeman argued that “… The notion that the person whose cells bring profit to 
others is him or herself neglected is not consonant with our intuitive ideas of fairness and 
justice.”70  The court's failure in Moore v. Regents of the University of California71 to make a 
moral judgment in favour of Moore sends out the wrong message. A compulsory-purchase 
scheme advocated by Erin and Harris72 may provide a solution. This acknowledges the patient's 
status as owner and compensates him for the appropriation of his excised body materials.73 The 
argument then should be that it is not absolutely non-commercialisation that is ethical, but not 
to commercialise the process such that the profits are unconnected with the wellbeing and or 
welfare of the parties involved, especially the donor. 
   
Emerging Markets and the Iranian Model Example 
Across the countries and legal systems one finds various shades of the changing attitudes 
towards the commercialisation of body parts. They range from extreme cases of absolute ban 
through to where the exchange of body parts for non-monetary rewards are allowed; down to 
                                                 
70 M.D.A.Freeman “Biotechnology, patients and profits: how is the law to respond?” in I.Robinson, at p 126. 
Robinson (ed) Life and death under high technology medicine vol.15 Fulbright Papers (Manchester, 1994) 
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73 Sophie Mills, “Owning my "self": a reconciliation of perspectives on the body” UCL Juris. Rev. 1999, 6, 191-
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where a system covertly or otherwise allows one to claim a fee for his or her body part. As the 
cursory survey above shows. 
Besides the diverse positions and attitudes seen in the laws academic and professional 
views have not stood static in these areas. At the American Transplantation Congress, Arthur 
Matas of the University of Minnesota transplant team, noting that a wait time of over 5 years, 
induces death on the waiting list of 7% annually, called for a regulated system of living kidney 
sales.74 This Matas’ proposal includes careful donor medical and psychosocial evaluations with 
a fixed tax-free payment to the donor plus an option of short- or long-term health and life 
insurance. Matas pointed out that surrogate mothers are individuals who benefit others without 
losing their dignity or becoming victims. Similarly, paid organ donors are not victims who are 
unable to determine what happens to their body. A more positive endorsement for legalizing 
human organ sales was provided by Robert Berman of the Orthodox Jewish Halachic75 Organ 
Donor Society writing in the Jerusalem Post of 9 August 2005: “The choice before us in not 
between buying or not buying organs. This is happening regardless of the law. The choice is 
whether transplant operations and the sale of organs will be regulated or not.” 
In Iran, the system of organ donation was designed with the intention of providing 
treatment and organs for those in need, by encouraging organ donation through the use of 
financial incentives. Another intention was to eliminate the black market in organs by creating 
a government-sponsored and regulated organization in charge of coordinating donors and 
recipients. In these transactions, money is given to the donor by both the government and by 
the recipients as compensation for their time and sacrifice. The system in Iran is the first of its 
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kind, with the apparent intention of assisting the sick and the impoverished, as well as providing 
appropriate financial compensation to the poor. This system of using a government-sponsored 
agency to recruit donors has been successful in eliminating waiting lists for kidney patients; 
however, it is not without controversy. Within Iran, the ethical debates surrounding this system 
continue among both physicians and scholars. Economists, including Nobel-laureate Gary 
Becker, and professionals within the transplant industry worldwide, suggest that a system of 
financial compensation for kidney donors will increase the supply of much-needed organs, 
thereby reducing the death and suffering of dialysis patients. In this regard, Iran is often looked 
to as a model for other countries.76 
 The problem of the exploitation of donors is controlled by creating an official 
mechanism that controls and supervises transplants, and looks after the interests of the vendors. 
According to Hippen, insofar as the kidney procurement system in Iran can be characterized as 
a “market,” it is a highly standardized and regulated market with only modest room for 
negotiation. Vendors are paid in two ways. First, the Iranian government provides a fixed 
compensation to the vendor, plus limited health insurance cover. This cover currently extends 
to one year after the procedure, and covers only conditions deemed related to the surgery. 
Second, the vendor receives separate remuneration either from the recipient or, if the recipient 
is impoverished, from one of a series of designated charitable organizations.77 
The most contentious disagreements in the literature regarding kidney vending in Iran 
have to do with the personal, physical, and financial consequences for vendors themselves. 
This issue is compounded by the absence of any routine follow-up. A crucial moral failing of 
the Iranian system is that there is not a similarly structured system for the post operation 
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management of vendors as there is for the process leading up to the sale of organs. The available 
data show that the quality of life organ vendors live after the procedure is relatively less than 
that of non-organ vendors.78 Although the reasons for this reduced quality of life is diverse, 
there are certainly psycho-social complications that the vendor is left with, too many for the 
system to control as it currently stands. It is not only a moral failure, but a systemic and an 
institutional one, capable of being corrected. 
There is a proposal in the neighbouring Israel which could be copied. A live donor 
whose organ is incompatible with a particular recipient may be able to trade his organ for a 
suitable match.79 Alternatively, the donors could be given priority for themselves or their 
family when a future medical need might arise. Moreover, one could be allowed to trade in 
return of particular social benefits relating to education, health and family needs.80 Although 
no money is involved in this method, it does mirror the proposal of Matas involving tax-free 
payment to donors in support of aftercare.81 
 
Conclusion 
Current practices and thinking challenge the World Health Organisation 1991 Guiding 
Principles as well as what might be described as the traditional view on sale of body parts. It 
has become imperative that the WHO updates its guidance to Member States, and to align with 
the direction of most viewpoints today – to give more room for both monetary and non-
monetary rewards for organ donors. The WHO should also evaluate practice and validate 
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potential model transplantation programmes most of which are based on the various proposals 
above which seat on different points on the altruism spectrum. Besides working with Member 
States to gather data and review practices and values, WHO should explore opportunities to 
cooperate with international scientific bodies on the same grounds. 
 The dealings in human body parts should be opened up further and seen in the dim light 
of commerce, yet where ethics are also relevant. It should not be the absolute altruistic as it 
demonises other ethical but non-altruistic conducts in this sphere. The suggestion that the 
slightest introduction of money to the organ donation equation is unethical is extreme and old 
fashioned. That view needs rethinking. The notion of the buyer/receiver being able to 
compensate the seller/vendor with health care credits of some kind should be a significant 
achievement of any system. Moreso in countries where such health care credits are 
unaffordable and a donor goes on to donate or sell with the aim of acquiring that health care 
credit, or perhaps seeks the highest bidder not the one in the greatest need. Some price and 
exchange control should be the direction of policy, not absolute ban on the practice. If policy 
and lawmakers are still stuck in the past, the horse has long bolted while they struggle to close 
the stable door – see the booming black market. 
